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1. Introduction 
What, if any, are the effects of globalization on corporate debt maturity? In 
particular, what have been the effects of increased access to international capital 
markets, diminished financial repression, and increased domestic financial 
development on the maturity of corporate debt during the early stages of 
globalization? The former questions are of particular importance for the South Korean 
economy, where the shortening of corporate debt maturity has occupied the center of 
the stage in multiple opportunities in the period spanning the 1990s and early 2000s. 
As a way of illustration, consider the following.    
“Crunch time is approaching for South Korea, threatening a liquidity shortage 
similar to the one that nearly brought the economy to a standstill at the end of last 
year…The cause of the potential credit crunch: a huge wave of corporate debt that 
matures in the second half of the year. From large semiconductor makers to smaller 
firms in industries ranging from steel to shipping, roughly 28% of all corporate bonds 
outstanding in South Korea will come due around the same time. Economists and 
central bankers worry that without both shrewd financial planning by the Korean 
authorities and some improvement in the global economy, the wave of debt could 
prompt liquidity to dry up in one of Asia’s largest economies…In the six months 
starting in July, more than US$ 27.9 billion of corporate debt will come to maturity, 
according to the Bank of Korea. The figure excludes companies that are already in 
default or in debt restructuring programs…The six month total is more than twice the 
amount of bonds that came due in the first half of 2001, and almost 30% heavier that 
the wave of debt that struck in the second half of 2000.” (Booth, 2001)       
This type of account on the South Korean economy has become more and 
more frequent in the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s. First was the Asian 
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crisis triggered by the financial turmoil in Thailand in June 1997 that eventually 
spread to South Korea (see Corden, 2002: 209-212, and Isard, 2005: 142-144). Later 
came the events of the second half of 2000, which were eventually followed by the 
events of the second half of 2001 described in the previous quotation. A natural 
question almost poses itself for consideration: What are the factors driving the 
shortening of corporate debt maturity in South Korea?       
This paper traces the origins of the shortening of corporate debt maturity in 
South Korea back to the early 1990s when the process of globalization first gained 
momentum. Globalization is captured in this paper with variables such as financial 
liberalization, increased access to international bond and equity markets, and the 
increase in the development of the domestic equity and financial markets. A main 
finding is that a crucial factor behind the shortening of corporate debt maturity during 
the early stages of globalization was financial liberalization. This finding lends partial 
support to the idea that that the effects of financial liberalization can indeed be 
summarized as “short-term pain, long-term gain” (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002).   
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two describes 
some specialized literature connected with this study and places this paper in context. 
Section three presents and discusses the main results of this investigation, including 
some robustness exercises. Section four concludes the paper.             
 
2. Related literature: a brief detour       
 The issue of corporate debt maturity is, of course, not a new one. Given space 
limitations it is not possible to present a complete survey of the extensive literature on 
the subject. The reader interested in a comprehensive survey of corporate debt 
maturity is referred to Ravid (1996).  
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The empirical finance literature using country case studies to shed light on the 
maturity structure of corporate debt has concentrated on analyzing its effects on the 
value of the firm (recent case studies for European firms include the ones by Ozkan 
(2000) and Ozkan (2002) for a sample of British firms, and Heyman et al. (2003) for a 
sample of small Belgian firms. For the case of the US firms, see Barclay and Smith, 
1995, for instance).  
Some studies have concentrated on studying the cross-country evidence on the 
effects of various institutions and policies on the shortening of the maturity structure 
of corporate debt. Prominent among them is Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic’s 
(1999) study of the capital structure of firms in 30 developing and developed 
countries during the period 1980-1991.    
 Other studies have concentrated their attention on the effects of 
specific policies or macroeconomic variables on the maturity of corporate debt. 
Among them, inflation has been a prominent choice. The impact of inflation on the 
shortening in the maturity structure of corporate debt has been emphasized by Klein 
(1975), Aarstol (2000), and Guerrero (2004). 
 The study that is probably closer to the present paper is Schmukler and 
Vesperoni (2001). They conduct a cross-country study of the effects of globalization 
on firms’ financing choices in an unbalanced panel of firms in 8 Latin American and 
East Asian countries. Interestingly, South Korea is one of the countries in their study. 
However, there are important differences in their goals and methods, relative to those 
of the present paper. First, Schmukler and Vesperoni (2001) are not interested in 
deriving country-specific conclusions. Second they are mainly interested in studying 
the effects of financial crisis on firms’ financing choices and for that reason their 
sample spans a period including the late 1990s. This paper purposefully excludes the 
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period following the Mexican crisis of December 1994, because the focus is on the 
effects of early globalization on corporate debt maturity. Finally, there is an important 
methodological difference between the present study and Schmukler and Vesperoni’s, 
namely, that their panel was of an unbalanced nature and the one in this paper is a 
balanced panel, since the objective here is to track the same firms during two different 
periods: the 1980s, when international financial integration was relatively modest, and 
the early 1990s when international financial integration got a head start before the 
Mexican financial crisis of late 1994 brought international financial markets to a halt.    
 
3. Uncovering the effects of early globalization on the maturity of corporate debt 
in South Korea, 1980-94. 
This section is devoted to documenting the effects of early globalization on the 
ratio (long-term debt/total debt) for the case of South Korea during the period 1980-
94.  
The next subsection –subsection 3.1- defines the variables to be used in the 
regressions. In subsection 3.2., different econometric specification methods and their 
associated results are presented. Finally, in subsection 3.3., some relevant robustness 
exercises are discussed.   
 3. 1. Variables Definition 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the ratio (long-term debt/total 
debt), denoted (LTD/TD). Following the recent empirical literature that studies firms’ 
financing decisions (Demirguc Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999, Booth et al., 2001, 
Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2001, 2006, etc) the vector of observable firms’ 
characteristics comprises five variables. The first variable is a proxy for the size of the 
firms: the logarithm of firms’ net fixed assets, denoted Fixed Assets in the 
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regressions). The second variable is an indicator of asset tangibility: the ratio of net 
fixed assets to total assets (denoted Tangibility of Assets in the regressions). The third 
variable is an indicator of firms’ revenues: the ratio of net sales to net fixed assets 
(denoted Net Sales/Fixed Assets in the regressions). The fourth variable is a proxy for 
the profitability of firms: the ratio of profits to total assets (denoted Profits/Total 
Assets in the regressions). Please find descriptive statistics for all these five variables 
in Table 1 below.  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
To capture the potential effects of expanding firms’ financing opportunities 
through increased access to international bond and equity markets on the maturity of 
corporate debt, two proxies for firms’ access to international debt and equity markets 
are included. The variable capturing access to international bond markets is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one for periods in which a given firm issues bonds in 
international capital markets, and zero otherwise. The variable capturing access to 
international equity markets is defined as a dummy variable that takes the value one 
from the moment when a firm starts trading (or raising capital) in international equity 
markets, and zero otherwise.  
Two alternative measures to proxy for financial liberalization were used. First, 
a multidimensional index that is the arithmetic average of individual indices that 
capture the degrees of liberalization of: interest rates caps, the degree of control of 
private credit by the central bank, the level of marginal and average reserve 
requirements, and restrictions to both capital inflows and capital outflows. Each of the 
individual indices takes three possible values: 1, 2, or 3, where 3 represents full 
financial liberalization, 2 partial financial repression, and 1 full financial repression. 
The information to construct these indices was taken from Kaminsky and Schmukler 
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(2002). This multidimensional index of financial liberalization is the one reported in 
the tables below. Results were unchanged when the multidimensional index of 
financial liberalization was replaced by a dummy variable that follows the stock 
market liberalization dates reported in Bekaert and Harvey (2000). 
To control for the effect of rapid development of the domestic equity and 
credit markets on the maturity of corporate debt, the sum of stock market 
capitalization and the outstanding liabilities of the banking sector --both in percent of 
GDP-- was used to proxy for the degree of financial development, following Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000). 
The rate of inflation (proxied by the rate of change of the Consumer Price 
Index), and the rate of growth of real GDP were used to control for the effects of the 
macroeconomic environment on the maturity of corporate debt. None of them came 
up significant, and so they are nor reported in the regressions displayed in the tables 
below. 
3. 2. Econometric specifications and baseline econometric results 
Six different specification alternatives are used: (i) plain OLS estimates, (ii) the firm-
Fixed Effects estimates, (iii) the Random Effects estimates, (iv) Instrumental 
Variables estimates where the set of microeconomic right hand side regressors (Fixed 
Assets, Tangibility of Assets, etc.) are instrumented by using the first lag of every 
variable, (v) Instrumental variable estimates that include firm-fixed effects and use the 
first and second lags of the microeconomic variables (Fixed Assets, Tangibility of 
Assets, etc) as instruments, and (vi) the Arellano and Bond estimator, a dynamic panel 
data procedure that controls both for the potential endogeneity of the micro variables 
that are used as right hand side regressors, as well as for potential time series 
problems of the endogenous variable, (LTD/TD).  
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The idea behind the inclusion of the OLS estimates is to provide the basic 
multivariate correlation embedded in the data. To control for potential autocorrelation, 
Prais-Winsten models with panel-corrected standard errors were also run, where the 
parameters are estimated by OLS and when computing the standard errors the 
disturbances are assumed to be heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated 
across panels; results did not vary much relative to the standard case and are not 
included here to save on space, but are available upon request. In any case, the OLS 
estimates are usually criticized when used with individual or firm-level data because 
they do not control for unobservable characteristics that could be biasing the 
estimated coefficients or introducing a potential reverse causation problem. To control 
for these unobservable characteristics, the firm-specific Fixed Effects estimation 
procedure is included. Because the fixed effects estimates disregard all the cross-
sectional variation, an alternative (static) panel data technique is presented next: 
Random Effects estimates, a weighted average of the purely cross-sectional estimate 
and the Fixed Effects estimates (Finally, the purely cross-sectional estimates are not 
included here for a couple of reasons. First, they are subject to similar criticism than 
the one raised for the case of OLS estimates. Another problem of the “between 
groups”, or purely cross-sectional estimate, in the present context is that by the very 
nature of the experiment to be conducted here --the study of the changes of the ratio 
(long-term debt/total debt) over time as influenced by developments connected to 
globalization--, a method that completely disregards the time dimension of the data is 
simply inadequate for the purpose of this investigation.)   
Given the potential endogeneity of most -if not all- of the observable firm 
characteristics (size, tangibility of assets, profitability, etc), instrumental variable 
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estimates that use the value of these variables lagged one and two periods is presented 
(in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2, respectively).   
Table 2 below reports the results for all the procedures just described. Column 
(1) reports the OLS estimates, column (2) the firm-specific fixed effect estimates, 
column (3) the random effect estimates, column (4) the IV estimates, column (5) the 
IV estimates combined with a vector of firm-specific dummy variables, an estimation 
procedure that controls for the potential endogeneity introduced by both the 
observable and the unobservable characteristics of the firms in the sample. Finally, 
column (6) contains the results produced by the Arellano-Bond estimation procedure, 
a more sophisticated IV procedure that also takes care of potential problems of non-
stationarity, by first differencing the data and including the lag of the dependent 
variable as a right hand side regressor.   
(Insert Table 2 here) 
As Table 2 shows, the most reliable microeconomic determinant of corporate 
debt maturity is the proxy for the tangibility of assets. Indeed, all specification 
methods give the same, uniform, message: more tangible assets lengthen the maturity 
of corporate debt. The result is always statistically significant at the 1% level, and 
quite stable (and economically relevant) quantitatively: increasing the tangibility of 
assets in one full percentage point increases the ratio (LTD/TD) in at least a third of a 
percentage point. This result is stronger than the one found for other emerging 
economies in similar studies (Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2001, 2006; Guerrero, 2004, 
Guerrero, 2006). There seems to be a very slight upward bias in the estimation of the 
effect of assets’ tangibility on the maturity of corporate debt in the specifications that 
do not control for the potential endogeneity of the vector of microeconomic 
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determinants, as shown by simple inspection of the relevant row in Table 2 as one 
moves from columns (1)-(3) to columns (4)-(6).  
No other microeconomic determinant of corporate debt is statistically 
significant for all econometric specifications; the proxy for size (the variable Fixed 
Assets) comes close, but fails the test for the last specification, the only specification 
that controls for time series problems like inertia. Fixed Assets displays a significant 
amount of inertia, and once the lag of the dependent variable, another significant 
displayer of inertia, is allowed in the estimation, the explanatory power of Fixed 
Assets vanishes. This result is not new; a similar one has been reported in case studies 
for Turkish and Argentine firms (see Guerrero, 2006, and Guerrero, 2004, 
respectively). A second problem with the proxy for size is that it alternates in sign 
across different econometric specifications.   
Neither the proxy for revenues (Net Sales/Net Fixed Assets), nor the indicator 
for profitability (Profits/Total Assets) had any significant impact on the maturity of 
corporate debt. This result is also different from results previously found for other 
emerging economies (Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2001, 2006; Guerrero, 2004, etc). 
Turning to the variables proxying for the effects of early-stage globalization, 
we first note from the relevant rows of Table 2 that neither one of the access variables 
carries any weight in explaining the maturity of corporate debt. Likely, this is more a 
reflection of the incipient nature of the process of financial integration of South 
Korean firms to the international markets during the period under consideration than a 
disqualification of the relevance of the variables, per se. The next proxy for financial 
integration to the international markets is the multidimensional index of financial 
liberalization. The results in this case resemble those found for the tangibility of assets 
both in terms of the statistical and economical significance across econometric 
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specifications. When the South Korean economy moved from a state of financial 
repression to a relatively more liberal one, corporate debt maturity shortened by 
roughly a tenth of the average value it had in the previous state. Finally, the variable 
that proxies for the degree of financial development of the domestic financial sector 
displays a similar problem than the one associated with Fixed Assets, namely that it 
loses its statistical significance in the last econometric specification, precisely the only 
one that explicitly controls for potential dynamic problems (the indicator for Financial 
Development displays a significant degree of inertia, as does the dependent variable, 
so once the lagged dependent variable is added to the specification, it steals a 
considerable degree of explanatory power from the financial development indicator.) 
Therefore, the overall effect of increased financial integration during the early stages 
of globalization is to shorten the maturity of corporate debt, a finding that is in line 
with the one reported previously by Schmukler and Vesperoni (2001) for an 
unbalanced panel of East Asian firms during the period 1980-99.        
       3. 3. Robustness (I): An alternative proxy for firms’ access to international 
capital markets 
 Given the lack of significance of the access variables in the regressions 
reported in Table 2, a natural question is to what degree that result is being driven by 
the particular definition chosen to proxy for the access variables. Consequently, we 
introduce a different proxy in this subsection. Specifically, the two access variables 
are now proxied by the number of times that firms had access to either the 
international bonds or equity markets. The results are displayed in Table 3 below.   
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 The results are not very different from the ones displayed in Table 2 before.  
Though there is a slight improvement in the significance of the access variable, the 
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access variable does not stay significant in either sense in most specifications. A 
second result is that the new proxy for access steals some statistical significance from 
the Financial Liberalization index and it also increases the variation of its quantitative 
effect across specifications.   
 3. 4. Robustness (II): The potential endogeneity of the variables proxying for 
firms’ access to international capital markets 
 A legitimate concern with the regressions displayed in Tables 2 and 3 above is 
related to the potential endogeneity bias introduced by the access variables. To 
address that potential source of trouble, the following strategies were implemented. 
As a first attempt, first lags of the same proxies used in Table 2 were used –under the 
assumption that the lags were predetermined variables. As a second attempt, a twofold 
procedure was followed. First, in the case of the variable access to equity markets,  
lags of the same variable were used as instruments. Following both Schmukler and 
Vesperoni (2001; 2006) and Ozkan (2000), two lags were used as instruments. In the 
case of the variable access to bonds markets an instrument that indicates whether 
capital markets were open for the country was constructed. The instrument, first 
proposed by Schmukler and Vesperoni (2001), takes a value of one if two conditions 
are fulfilled: (i) At least one firm had access to international bonds markets during 
that period, and (ii) the firm was able to issue international bonds at least once during 
the sample period. Otherwise, the instrument takes a value of zero. 
 The results provided by the two strategies were quite similar. Table 4 presents 
the simpler case where first lags for the same access variables previously used in 
Table 2 are included as right-hand side regressors.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
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Results are almost identical to the ones presented in Table 2 before: the main 
microeconomic determinant of corporate debt maturity is the tangibility of assets, and 
financial liberalization is the main proxy for international financial integration 
affecting corporate debt maturity.    
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 Using a balanced panel for publicly traded South Korean firms, this paper 
documented the evolution of corporate debt maturity during an early stage of 
international financial integration. This paper uncovered evidence that the increased 
financial liberalization brought about by the process of globalization significantly 
reduced the length of corporate debt for the case of publicly traded South Korean 
corporations during the period 1980-94. This result is particularly relevant in the 
South Korean case, given frequently aired concerns about the potentially disastrous 
macroeconomic effects that the shortening of corporate debt maturity could bring 
about. Furthermore, the findings of this paper seem to lend support to the hypothesis 
that financial liberalization can be adequately described as “short-term pain, long-
term gain” (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002).      
 
 
(*) The author wants to thank Roger Betancourt, Mardi Dungey, Jan P. A. M. Jacobs, 
Sergio Schmukler, Zurina Shafii, Susan Thorp, and Esteban Vesperoni for useful 
comments and discussions on some of the technical aspects of this paper, and In-
Joung Kang for helpful discussions on the South Korean case. The author bears full 
responsibility for all errors, omissions and mistakes. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Micro variables 
  
Variables    Mean   Std 
Dev 
   Max    Min         # of Obs. 
(LTD/TD) overall     
/1 
0.368 0.15 0.90 0.01 N   =      
/4 
     1215
between  
/2 
0.11 0.62 0.17 n    =      
/5 
81
within      
/3 
0.10 0.82 -0.03 T-bar =   
/6  
15
Fixed Assets overall 10.94 1.34 15.09 6.98 N = 1215
between 1.08 13.39 8.37 n = 81
within 0.80 13.29 8.28 T-bar = 15
Tangibility of 
Assets 
overall 0.379 0.16 1.01 0.01 N = 1215
between 0.14 0.69 0.04 n = 81
within 0.07 0.76 0.04 T-bar = 15
Net Sales/ Fixed 
Asset 
overall 4.537 8.09 138.94 0.23 N = 1215
between 5.74 39.32 0.90 n = 81
within 5.73 118.19 -25.89 T-bar = 15
Profits/Total 
Assets 
overall 0.021 0.03 0.18 -0.28 N = 1215
between 0.02 0.08 -0.05 n = 81
within 0.03 0.22 -0.20 T-bar = 15
  
Notes:   
/1: Overall means combined between and within variation; /2: Between means across firms; 
 /3: Within means across years; /4: N=total number of observations; /5: n= number of firms;  
/6: T-bar=average number of years of data available for the firms included in the sample. 
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Table 2. Baseline regression results 
 
Estimation Method 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 OLS 
 
 
 
        
LTD/TD 
 
FIXED  
EFFECTS 
 
 
 
LTD/TD 
RANDOM 
EFFECTS 
 
 
 
LTD/TD 
    IV  
(ONE LAG 
INSTRUM.) 
 
 
LTD/TD  
        IV  
WITH FIRM--
-SPECIFIC  
DUMMIES 
 
LTD/TD 
    GMM 
ARELLANO-     
--BOND 
VARS IN DIFF 
 
 LTD/TD 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
 
1215 
 
 
1215 
 
 
1215 
 
 
1134 
 
 
1053 
 
 
1053 
 
       
Constant   0.175 
t = 3.40***   
   0.561 
t = 8.93***
    0.447 
z = 7.75***
   0.118 
t = 2.03**
     0.519 
t = 5.18***
      0.009 
z = 2. 86***
FIXED ASSETS   0.01 
t = 2.25***  
  -0.032 
t = -4.44***  
   -0.019 
z = -3.05***   
   0.015 
t = 3.17***
   -0.027 
t = 2.31**
     -0.012 
z = 0.79 
TANGIBILITY of assets 0.386 
t =12.28***  
   0.352 
t = 7.77***
    0.356 
z = 8.73***    
   0.364 
t = 9.63***   
     0.345 
t =  4.32***
      0.326 
z = 4.56***
NET SALES/FIXED 
ASSETS 
  0.002 
 t = 3.79***  
   0.001 
t = 0.94 
    0.001 
z = 1.73*  
   0.003 
t = 3.19***
     0.001 
t =  0.41 
     -0.001 
z = -1.23 
PROFITS/TOTAL 
ASSETS 
-0.075 
t = -0.70     
   -0.010 
t = -1.04 
   -0.113 
z = -1.16  
   0.014 
t = 0.08 
     0.053 
t =  0.20      
     -0.026 
z = -0.22 
Access to bond markets   0.019 
t = 0.65 
    0.041 
t = 1.84 *
    0.039 
z =  1.72*
   0.012 
t = 0.43 
     0.040 
t =  1.77*
0.033 
z = 1.39 
Access to equity markets    0.000 
t = 0.37 
    0.000 
t = 1.07   
    0.000 
z = 1.00  
   0.000 
t = 0.21 
     0.000 
t = 0.93 
     0.000 
z = 0.52 
Financial Liberalization 
Index 
   - 0.105 
t =-3.39***
   -0.084 
t = -3.62***  
   -0.091 
z = -3.92***
  -0.102 
t = -3.30***
    -0.06 
t = -2.36**
     -0.081 
z = -3.85***
Financial Markets 
Development Index 
      0.087 
t = 5.88***
    0.152 
t = 9.53***
    0.132 
z = 8.76***
    0.084 
t = 4.80***
      0.128 
t = 6.18***
     -0.026 
z = -1.00 
(LTD/TD)(t-1)      0.462 
z = 11.32***
F-Statistic    41.73      24.54              33.43 15.71  
Chi-statistic       -       -     52.65           -         -       200.54 
Sargan test Chi Stat       -       -        -                   175.84 
R2     0.22 
 
     0.60       0.60         0.21 0.60 - 
 
 
 
Notes: (***) means statistical significance at the 1% level; (**) means statistical 
significance at the 5% level.  
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Table 3. Robustness (I): Access is proxied by the number of times firms got 
access to international bond and equity markets 
 
Estimation Method 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 OLS 
 
 
 
        
LTD/TD 
 
FIXED  
EFFECTS 
 
 
 
LTD/TD 
RANDOM 
EFFECTS 
 
 
 
LTD/TD 
    IV  
(ONE LAG 
INSTRUM.) 
 
 
LTD/TD  
        IV  
WITH FIRM--
-SPECIFIC  
DUMMIES 
 
LTD/TD 
    GMM 
ARELLANO-     
--BOND 
VARS IN DIFF 
 
 LTD/TD 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
 
1215 
 
 
1215 
 
 
1215 
 
 
1134 
 
 
1053 
 
 
1053 
 
       
Constant 0.237 
t = 2.74***   
0.665 
t = 7.70***
    0.532 
z = 6.55***
   0.145 
t = 1.51 
     0.567 
 t = 4.28***
      0.01 
z = 2.99***
FIXED ASSETS    0.01 
t =2.46**   
  -0.032 
t = -4.44***  
   -0.019 
z = -2.95***   
   0.016 
t = 3.35***
   -0.025 
t = -2.11**
    -0.011 
z = -0.73 
TANGIBILITY of assets    0.384 
t =12.33***  
   0.352 
t = 7.78***
    0.354 
z = 8.71***    
   0.362 
t =  9.67***   
     0.339 
t = 4.19***
      0.311 
z = 4.29***
NET SALES/FIXED 
ASSETS 
   0.002 
t = 3.79***    
   0.000 
t = 0.83   
    0.001 
z = 1.67*  
   0.003 
t = 3.17***
     0.001 
t = 0.39 
    -0.001 
z = -1.20 
PROFITS/TOTAL 
ASSETS 
  -0.072 
t =-0.68     
  -0.099 
t = -0.99 
   -0.109 
z = -1.12  
   0.011 
t = 0.06 
     0.03 
t =  0.12      
    -0.042 
z = -0.35 
Number of Accesses to 
Int’l markets  
   0.002 
t = 1.01 
   0.033 
t = 2.15**
    0.002 
 z = 1.88*
   0.001 
t = 0.42 
     0.001 
t = 1.01 
    -0.0004 
z = -0.35 
Financial Liberalization 
Index 
   -0.15 
t =-2.72***
  -0.155 
t = -3.79***  
   -0.154 
z = -3.74***   
  -0.122 
t = -2.15**
    -0.101 
t = -2.19**
    -0.068 
z = -1.85*
Financial markets 
Development Index 
    0.081 
t = 4.59***
   0.144 
t = 8.98***   
    0.124 
z = 8.13***
   0.081 
t = 4.40***
      0.124 
t = 6.03***
    -0.033 
z = -1.17 
(LTD/TD)(t-1)      0.471 
z = 11.62***
F-Statistic    47.78    24.68            38.38 15.82  
Chi-statistic       -       -     187.10           -         -       207.98 
Sargan test Chi Stat       -       -        -             176.93 
R2      0.22      0.60       0.60         0.21 0.59 - 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (***) means statistical significance at the 1% level; (**) means statistical 
significance at the 5% level.  
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Table 4. Robustness (II): Addressing the potential endogeneity of the access to 
international bond and equity markets variables 
 
Estimation Method 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 OLS 
 
 
 
        
LTD/TD 
 
FIXED  
EFFECTS 
 
 
 
LTD/TD 
RANDOM 
EFFECTS 
 
 
 
LTD/TD 
    IV  
(ONE LAG 
INSTRUM.) 
 
 
LTD/TD  
        IV  
WITH FIRM--
-SPECIFIC  
DUMMIES 
 
LTD/TD 
    GMM 
ARELLANO-     
--BOND 
VARS IN DIFF 
 
 LTD/TD 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
 
1215 
 
 
1215 
 
 
1215 
 
 
1134 
 
 
1053 
 
 
239 
 
       
Constant    0.23 
 t = 1.79*   
    0.572 
t = 8.26***
  0.447 
z = 7.13***
   0.117 
t = 1.91*
      0.522 
t = 5.15***
    0.009 
z = 2.91***
FIXED ASSETS    0.01 
t = 2.02**   
   -0.036 
t = -4.51***  
 -0.021 
z = -3.07***   
   0.015 
t = 3.05***
     -0.028 
t = -2.34**
   -0.01 
z = -0.66 
TANGIBILITY of 
Assets 
   0.369 
t =11.28***  
    0.406 
t = 8.18***
   0.389 
z = 8.89***    
   0.363 
t =  9.51***   
      0.361 
t = 4.37***
    0.306 
z = 4.22***
NET SALES/FIXED 
ASSETS 
   0.002 
t = 3.68***    
    0.000 
t = 0.32   
   0.001 
z = 1.27  
   0.003 
t = 3.20***
      0.001 
t =  0.39 
   -0.001 
z = -1.23 
PROFITS/TOTAL 
ASSETS 
  -0.058 
t = -0.51     
   -0.06 
t = -0.57 
  -0.074 
z = -0.72  
   0.014 
t = 0.08 
      0.057 
t =  0.22      
   -0.037 
z = -0.32 
Access to Int’l bond 
markets-proxy 2 
   0.015 
t = 0.44  
    0.035 
t = 1.36 
   0.032 
z = 1.23    
   0.014 
t =  0.41   
      0.031 
t =  1.22 
   -0.01 
z = -0.41 
Access to Int’l equity 
markets-proxy 2  
   0.007 
t = 0.34 
    0.016 
t = 0.92 
   0.016 
z = 0.88 
   0.000 
  t = 0.02 
      0.014 
t =  0.78 
   -0.003 
z = -0.13 
Financial Liberalization 
Index 
  -0.104 
t =-3.36***
   -0.085 
t = -3.65***  
  -0.092 
z = -3.98***  
  -0.102 
t = -3.28***
     -0.063 
t = -2.47**
   -0.079 
z = -3.71***
Financial markets 
Development Index 
   0.093 
t = 5.42***
    0.158 
t = 9.73***   
   0.137 
z = 8.99***
   0.084 
t = 4.79***
      0.129 
t = 6.18***
   -0.03 
z = -1.11 
(LTD/TD)(t-1)      0.463 
z = 11.32***
F-Statistic   37.16   21.93          33.56 15.7  
Chi-statistic       -       -     189.68           -         -       198.12 
Sargan test Chi stat      176.40 
R2     0.11      0.60       0.60        0.21 0.60 - 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (***) means statistical significance at the 1% level; (**) means statistical 
significance at the 5% level.  
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